

WORLD MILITARY SITUATION AND ITS RELATION TO UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, and Mr. Newhouse of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. The committee will come to order.

Let me say to the members of the committee, you notice you have a statement before you that is classified. Leave it at your place when you go out. Don't take it from the room.

Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you with us this morning. We are in executive session. We are glad to have you bring the committee up to date on the national defense picture and its particular relationship to foreign policy.

For several years now, at the beginning of each session of Congress, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency have met with the committee to give us their assessment of the overall world situation. We are glad to have you here for that purpose.

Mr. Secretary, you understand that we do have this record taken down. If at any time, though, you would like to leave off any part of it being taken down, we can simply suspend the reporting.

This is kept confidential; it will not be published. It is kept locked in our own files here in the office for the use of the members of this committee, and not taken from the room. So, I think you can feel safe in its security, although sometimes there are some things that we would just rather not be put down in print at all, so you feel free to indicate at any time when you feel that is so.

You may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary McNAMARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to read a statement, one that may require 30 to 40 minutes to complete. However, there are certain points which I wish to make this morning with respect to our strategic policies and plans and I wish, therefore, to read it. I have reduced it to

writing and, with your permission, I would like to read this statement.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very good, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. I also hope you will interrupt at any time or ask questions relating to the text.

Senator SPARKMAN. Fine.

Secretary McNAMARA. Today, and as far as we can look into the future, we face formidable international problems. None of these problems appears susceptible of an exclusively military solution. Military power is but one of our tools for pursuing national goals. It can be used effectively only as part of a unified effort, fully meshed with the other instruments of our national policy.

Nevertheless, the military factor is always influential and is often a determinant in international affairs. This factor establishes a set of limits to the non-military courses of action otherwise available to us at any given time.

Because of the powerful influence of the military environment upon the great issues with which this committee deals, perhaps the most useful service I can render today is to outline the Defense Department's current evaluation of the principal elements and trends in the worldwide military situation. I will do this first by reviewing the relative nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and then by developing some of the considerations applicable to the balance of non-nuclear forces between NATO and the Soviet bloc. I will then treat the problems of covert Communist aggression.

SOVIET NUCLEAR STRIKE CAPABILITIES

We have recently completed a new estimate of Soviet strength in ICBM's. This estimate is the result of continued study of the available evidence which includes an accumulation of information in which we now have a high level of confidence. The essential conclusion of our assessment is that the Soviets have deployed a much smaller number of ICBM's than we had once thought they would by this time in early 1962.

The U.S.S.R. has relatively few ICBM's and a modest number of submarine-launched missiles capable of attack on North America. Despite the grave threat they pose to a number of areas, they are few in relation to the number of military targets it would be in the interest of the Soviet Union to attack. They represent only a limited threat to the nuclear strike force based in the United States or deployed at sea.

We now estimate that the Soviets will by mid-1962 have between 35 and 50 launchers from which missiles could be fired against the United States. The number of operational ICBM launchers will not increase markedly during the months immediately ahead. Our analysis leads us to believe that the Soviets decided not to deploy a large force of their first generation ICBM's, but to press for a more easily deployed second generation system. However, some of these new launchers will probably soon begin to receive second-generation missiles, and by mid-1963 we anticipate that the Soviets will perhaps be able to increase the number of launchers to a level of 75 to 125.

LAUNCHERS V. MISSILES

Senator GORE. May I ask a question?

Secretary McNAMARA. Surely

Senator GORE. When you say launchers, would this term include a facility from which a succession of missiles could be launched?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is difficult to answer that question with certainty with respect to the ICBM launchers. It definitely does include a launcher with a capability of firing more than one missile in the case of the medium-range missiles, and I will cover that subsequently.

Senator GORE. Very well.

Secretary McNAMARA. But with respect to the ICBM launchers, it seems most probable to us they have a capability of launching only one missile per launcher, but I cannot speak definitively on that point.

Senator LAUSCHE. When you speak of launchers, you mean the entire device equipped with the missile?

Secretary McNAMARA. Right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Ready to be fired?

Secretary McNAMARA. Right.

I use the term "launcher" as ready to be fired rather than missiles, because sometimes confusion has been injected into these discussions by using the word "missiles," which obviously includes missiles not on launcher and not ready to fire.

Senator GORE. Thank you for the clarification.

SOVIET BOMBER AND SUBMARINE STRENGTH

Secretary McNAMARA. The Soviet threat will thus increase in the future, but continued improvement in our own dispersal, hardening, and mobility will offset the threat to our U.S.-based nuclear delivery forces.

The bulk of present Soviet capability to attack the United States is in bombers and submarine-launched missiles. We believe that the U.S.S.R. could put about 200 bombers, excluding combat attrition, over North America on two-way missions in an initial attack, but such an attack could not be launched without our receiving warning more than adequate to alert our strategic forces and air defenses. The Soviets now have about 30 submarines equipped to carry and launch a combined total of about 90 ballistic missiles. Although about a third of these submarines are believed to be nuclear powered, all of them are handicapped for effective surprise attack against the United States by the long transit time from Soviet bases, by the short range of their missiles, and by their apparent inability to launch while submerged.

INTERMEDIATE RANGE STRIKE CAPABILITY

Our earlier estimate of large Soviet MRBM strength has, however, been substantiated. We believe that there are about 300 MRBM launchers within range of targets in the NATO area. These launchers are equipped with ballistic missiles having ranges from 700 to 1,100 miles and, as I mentioned a moment ago in answer to Senator Gore's question, we believe they have multi-launch capabilities.

We believe that the Soviets will also have a 2,000 nautical mile IRBM available in the near future. The Soviet nuclear strike capability against the European NATO area also includes several hundred jet medium bombers, plus short range aircraft and missiles. However, the Soviets cannot commit these forces threatening Europe, even in conjunction with a first strike on the United States, without the certain knowledge that they would receive an overwhelming counterattack by substantially intact U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

Finally, the ICBM's, IRBM's, and bombers of the U.S.S.R. are vulnerable to attack, being deployed at fixed, soft bases. Although Soviet air defenses are extensive, we are confident that we have sufficient knowledge of their locations and their performance limitations to avoid or neutralize them.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

In contrast to the Soviet strike capability, the United States and its allies have available a large and diversified nuclear arsenal which now provides, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future, a decided advantage in both delivery systems and nuclear weapons of practically every category.

The strategic forces include 50 operational ICBM's, and close to 1,700 heavy and medium bombers, including the V-force and available carrier based aircraft. In addition, 80 operational Polaris missiles and 90 IRBM's are deployed. Further, NATO now has a vast arsenal of tactical aircraft and missiles in the nuclear strike forces.

We have good reason to believe that our stockpile of nuclear weapons for delivery by this extensive system is of far greater magnitude and diversification than that of the Soviet Union. We have tens of thousands of warheads, ranging from a fraction of 1 kiloton to the largest size for which we now see any military use.

A STRONG NATO POSTURE

Much more important than our numerical superiority is the fact that the overall NATO nuclear posture, including forces external to the European continent, is far less vulnerable to enemy attack than the Soviet system. Our strength is deployed to strike Russia from every direction, and much of it is remote from the Soviet Union; in contrast, theirs is centralized and more easily reached. Our strength is better protected, more mobile, more dispersed, more diversified, and generally more advanced technically than theirs.

The external nuclear forces, principally those of the United States, of the NATO Alliance have a great and growing capacity to survive surprise attack. Fifty percent of the U.S. bomber force, with each aircraft carrying as a matter of fact—is on 15-minute ground alert. An airborne bomber alert capability has been developed and is constantly maintained. Our early warning system is being strengthened.

The United States already has some hardened ICBM sites coming into operational status, and the number of such sites will increase rapidly. The Polaris submarines, which add greatly to the invulnerability and flexibility of our overall system, do not depend on warn-

ing for their survival, and can launch their missiles from a submerged position at a range of at least 1,200 miles. This range will be increased in the near future, in 12 to 18 months.

STRENGTH OF BOMBER FORCE

Senator LONG. Can you tell us how many bombers we have capable of carrying these atomic missiles?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would be very happy to tell you. At the present time, let me give it to you as of July 1 of next year, that is a little easier, we will have at that point 1,550 bombers in our Strategic Air Command Forces, that are made up of 615 B-52's, 855 B-47's, and 80 B-58's.

The B-52's, generally speaking, can carry [deleted] and at that same time, which is next July 1, we will have about 460 air-to-surface missiles for those B-52's, the so-called Hound Dog. We will have in addition to that on the order of 140 Atlas and Titan missiles operational, and we will have 144 Polaris missiles operational. But that number, only about two-thirds at any one time on station. The net effect of all of this will be—may I have this off the record?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

BOMBER PENETRATION CAPABILITIES

Senator LONG. These bombers will have what I take it to be enough to shoot their way into the Soviet Union if they have to?

Senator WILEY. Does the Kremlin know this?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would like to answer his question first, and then I will answer that.

The penetration capabilities of these bombers are something that we cannot evaluate precisely. The Soviet Union has emphasized the construction of air defense weapons and systems over the past 2 to 3 years. They have placed a tremendous amount of their defense budget into the procurement of such systems, and today I believe that they are very effective.

These bombers, many of them, are equipped with Hound Dog missiles which can be launched between 350 and 600 miles from the target, and thereby they are penetration aids in the sense that they can be launched against air defense sites and air defense facilities, thus helping the bombers penetrate. Furthermore, the Polaris submarine missiles and the Atlas and the Titan missiles can also be launched ahead of the bombers against the air defense systems.

For both of these reasons the bombers' penetration capability will be greater July 1 than it was 1 or 2 years ago. Nonetheless, the air defense system of the Soviet Union against manned aircraft is likely to be so strong as to take a heavy toll of our bomber aircraft as they proceed to the target.

We have taken account of this, of course, in developing the force levels which we recommend to the President and he, in turn, to the Congress, and which are the foundation of our fiscal 1963 budget.

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. FORCES

Now, to answer Senator Wiley: I believe that the Soviet Union does know this. We have made it our objective to tell them in the last 9 months. Mr. Nitze, Mr. Gilpatrick,¹ and I have on several occasions spoken to this point publicly, both in order that the Soviet Union may know our power, but also so that our own allies and our own people may know it.

This is an extremely dangerous situation we are in. As I pursue this paper, I will try to indicate that, despite this power, we are in great danger. But we would be in greater danger if either our allies or our own people or the Soviet Union failed to understand the power we have. So we have made it our objective to disclose it.

Senator WILEY. That is why I wondered why you took this off the record, because if it is a deterrent, and the people here know it, Russia knows it, I do not see the advisability of keeping it further secret, because I just wondered—

Secretary McNAMARA. The specific point I wished to leave off the record was the number of warheads in our alert force. This is a vital point that can affect the disposition of their air defense and the operational plan that they would develop for the use of that air defense, and I wished to withhold that, at least for the present.

Senator WILEY. And the Kremlin does not know about those warheads? That is what my question was.

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir. It knows of the warheads, but it does not know specifically the number we have in our alert force.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

Secretary McNAMARA. If I may proceed then, starting with the second paragraph on page 5.

Finally, the United States has a command and control system which we believe will continue effective operations under major nuclear attack. We have hardened underground control centers, a continually airborne command post, and a command ship at sea, all of which provide a highly centralized system for control of nuclear weapons. We are confident that our command system gives the President a rapid and secure mechanism for bringing our nuclear power to bear when needed, and that it would remain operational throughout any foreseeable United States-Soviet nuclear exchange.

The net result of all these facts is that a clear military superiority for major nuclear conflict now exists, even if the Soviet Union strikes first. Moreover, this superiority is growing and we are determined that it shall be maintained.

In passing, let me say I gave you the number of warheads planned for our alert forces as of July 1 of this year. We plan to approximately double that in the 3 to 4 years ahead, and the programs which we presented to Congress are designed to that end.

¹Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, and Deputy Secretary Roswell S. Gilpatrick.

CONSIDERATIONS OF GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR

In light of the relative nuclear strike capabilities of the U.S.S.R. and NATO, we have developed a number of basic and critical judgments of the probable results of general nuclear war should these strengths on both sides be put to that test in a near time period.

The first conclusion which emerges is that U.S. nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union after a nuclear exchange, measured in surviving strategic nuclear forces, would be even greater than before. This would be the case no matter which side initiated the nuclear exchange. The Soviets cannot attack the relatively well-protected main base of our nuclear strength in sufficient force to keep us from inflicting enormous destruction on their delivery systems and on all parts of the civil societies of the Soviet Union as well.

The second major conclusion, however, is that Soviet-inflicted damage to the civil societies of the Alliance could be very grave indeed. Even if we attempted to destroy the enemy nuclear strike capability at its source, using all our available resources, some portion of the Soviet force would survive to strike back.

SOVIET STRATEGY CANNOT BE PREDICTED

In estimating the civil damage that might result, one must take into account not only numbers of vehicles that would reach their targets, and the size of their warheads, but also the strategy chosen by the Soviet Union.

There would be a high priority to hitting at military forces and, in view of the substantial Allied nuclear superiority, it would not seem militarily sound for the Soviets to attack civil targets. To do so would invite prompt, certain, and massive Allied destruction to the Soviet Union. Further, the Soviets may avoid nuclear attacks on civil targets in the hope of ultimately controlling a relatively intact Europe. Nevertheless, the rationale of a Soviet attack cannot be predicted, cities may be targeted, and even if this attack aimed primarily at military forces, extensive civil destruction would occur.

The final major conclusion which emerges is, therefore, that leaders on both sides must be aware that the likely results of a full nuclear exchange might be: Virtual destruction, not only of the nuclear power of the Soviet Union, but of its economic and social fabric as well; survival of the United States and the other NATO nations, but with very serious damage to their human and material resources.

THE NON-NUCLEAR BALANCE IN NATO

The implications of general nuclear war impose restraints on both the East and the West, but the pressures on the Soviet Union, arising from the nuclear balance, we believe, are stronger. Despite our best efforts to achieve a solution by political means, we must consider the possibility that we may have to take some kind of military action if we are not to lose our vital interests in Berlin through erosion. The threat of general nuclear war has not been sufficient thus far to deter the Soviets from pressures and other ac-

tions designed to erode our vital interests in Berlin. Conflict is inherent in the present situation unless the political course of one side or the other is changed.

Similarly, other crises at other parts of the NATO area may occur in the future. Bearing in mind the relative nuclear strength, it therefore becomes important to assess briefly our comparative non-nuclear strength and some of the implications involved.

In our view, the Russians have superiority in non-nuclear forces in Europe at the present time, but this superiority is not overwhelming. While the U.S.S.R. can today rapidly mobilize greater non-nuclear strength in Europe than can the NATO Alliance, the portion of this strength which can be effectively applied is limited by geographic, logistic, and above all by political and strategic factors.

It is our view that it is within the capability of the alliance during the course of the present tensions to provide non-nuclear defense of the NATO area adequate at least to hold a bloc non-nuclear attack for a period sufficient to cause the Soviet Union to realize the gravity of the course upon which it has embarked. In time, the NATO Alliance has the capability to create even stronger non-nuclear forces relative to such non-nuclear bloc forces as could be brought to bear under the restraint imposed by the nuclear threat.

RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF BOTH SIDES

The respective tactical air strengths which can now be brought rapidly to bear in Western Europe tend to favor the bloc. Maximum efforts by each side to reinforce might provide the bloc an additional quantitative edge; however, these increased capabilities could be achieved only at some sacrifice of other strategic considerations, and they would not be large. With a concentrated effort, the West can probably reduce or eliminate this advantage.

On the ground, there is a rough balance in effective divisions currently deployed in the area immediately critical to the Berlin situation. We can now count 24 NATO divisions on the central front so deployed, in comparison with the 26 Communist bloc divisions in East Germany. While the bloc enjoys a larger total reinforcement capability, the satellite divisions are of reduced value because of their doubtful reliability.

As to nominal total of some 147 active Russian divisions, over one-third are maintained at only cadre strength. Others are disposed for operations in other areas of the Soviet Union and in low states of readiness. It is therefore our considered estimate that, with due regard to the factors limiting Soviet freedom of action, a total of only 55 or so Soviet divisions would be brought to bear effectively in the first 30 days of hostilities.

Against this estimated ground threat, NATO could, during 1962, have on the order of 28-30 divisions deployed in Central Europe, with a capability of increasing this number up to 35-40 divisions within 30 days after the start of mobilization. These are not unfavorable ratios for the defender, particularly in view of the nuclear forces available to back them up.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

A number of conclusions concerning general and limited war flow from three basic judgments.

General nuclear war superiority is and must remain a fundamental strength of NATO, as of the whole free world. The alliance must maintain the psychological and physical readiness for general nuclear war as a central objective of its military policy in order to defend the vital interests of its members. The effects of general nuclear war, however, could be so grave that the alliance should engage in such action only when necessary in the defense of these vital interests and only after exhausting all feasible political, economic, and other lesser military actions.

Short of general nuclear war, the relative non-nuclear balance leaves the West vulnerable to the continued aggressive policy of the Soviet Union. The Soviets can attempt to exploit our vulnerabilities, always trying to avoid the threshold of general nuclear war, by a series of minor aggressions or possibly through limited but serious non-nuclear actions, probably followed by a prompt call for negotiations to avoid Western reaction. The capability to defeat Soviet aggression at whatever level it occurred would make such Soviet actions clearly futile.

NATO now has superiority in nuclear warfare and at sea and on land. To repeat, in the short term the NATO Alliance can offer a non-nuclear defense in Central Europe capable at least of holding a bloc non-nuclear attack without significant withdrawal for some period of time. In the longer run it is within the capability of the alliance to create still larger non-nuclear forces. In our view, the alliance should make certain that a future crisis will find us better prepared than the present one.

U.S. MUST HAVE CREDIBLE DETERRENT

Deterrence, the prevention of war while achieving NATO's objectives, must clearly remain our principal goal. However, NATO has heretofore not given adequate consideration to the possibility that deterrence may fail and that war may come in spite of our best efforts to the contrary. It is our belief that deterrence against large-scale Soviet military aggression based primarily on the threat of general nuclear war is not credible against many lesser Soviet actions, political as well as military, none of which is grave enough, in itself, to warrant recourse to general nuclear war.

Thus, we consider that we must recognize the dangers of exclusive reliance on general nuclear war as an instrument of policy and make the effort required to build a strong non-nuclear capability as well. We believe that the United States and the NATO Alliance must, in the words of President Kennedy, "have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action."

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Finally, before leaving the question of the nuclear balance and its implications, let me refer to one issue that is now reflected acutely in a NATO policy problem, but that has wider effects as

well. This is the issue of the spread of nuclear capabilities to additional countries.

On this, the position of the United States is clear. We remain strongly opposed to the creation within third countries of nuclear weapons capabilities, whether by independent production or by transfer of weapons.

Although several countries are now capable—or might become capable within a few years—of producing a limited number of nuclear weapons, it is exceedingly improbable within the foreseeable future that any country or group of countries could develop a capability that even remotely approached that of the United States or the Soviet Union. Moreover, nothing in the actions of the Soviets suggests that they are prepared to transfer nuclear weapons to the independent control of another Communist country.

NATO'S NUCLEAR DILEMMA

Nevertheless, we are confronted with the desire of certain European nations for an increased nuclear role within the context of NATO. These nations state that such a role is necessary if pressures for additional independent national capabilities are to be reduced or eliminated. We hope that after the Europeans are exposed to more of the facts of U.S. nuclear capabilities, they will be reassured and convinced of the undesirability of fundamental changes in the present ownership and control of nuclear weapons within the alliance.

Basically, the development of additional independent centers of nuclear decision would have a destabilizing effect on relations among all the major powers. Even with relatively minor nuclear capabilities, each additional center of decision would increase the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used for national purposes, or by accident, miscalculation, irrationality, or desperation, with a corresponding increase in the danger of setting off a general nuclear war.

COVERT AGGRESSION

I have dealt previously in detail with the non-nuclear balance in the NATO area. Elsewhere in the world, there exists a continuing danger of overt aggression against the countries on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. However, there are also powerful restraints that operate not only against general nuclear war, but against lesser overt aggressions.

There remains another major technique of aggression, one that is repeatedly and skillfully used by the Communists. This is what Mr. Khrushchev, in his speech of January 6, 1961, calls "wars of national liberation." We know them as subversion, induced or supported insurrection, guerrilla operations, or covert armed aggression. It is a form of warfare which has the advantage of remaining well below the threshold of a conventionally defined international aggression. At the same time, it is usable in countries which are not contiguous to the bloc, though it is a much more powerful technique in adjacent countries, where supply and reinforcement are easier and where the threat of overt military action compounds the defender's problems.

Covert aggression is not a new Communist technique. The political/military cadres who gradually seized control of the satellites of Eastern Europe after World War II and those who later seized North Korea, Red China, and North Vietnam had been carefully prepared for many years. Today, cadres are active in Laos and Vietnam, where insurgency has reached a high degree of development. We believe they are forming in a number of countries in various other regions of the world where insurgency is still only latent.

MAGNITUDE OF THREAT

The President underlined the magnitude of this threat when, in his address to the Congress in March 1961, he said: "In more areas of the world, the main burden of local defense against overt attack, subversion, and guerrilla warfare must rest upon local populations and forces. But given the great likelihood and seriousness of the form of strong, highly mobile forces, trained in this type of warfare . . ."

There is a large range of military/political options open to Communist attackers utilizing the covert aggression technique. These options include the subversion of individuals, tribes, fronts, parties; guerrilla warfare; and the entire gamut of Communist operations designed to undermine the free world. As serious as are the threats of general and limited war, in our judgment they do not in the long run exceed that of covert aggression. This is particularly true in this decade of the 1960's.

Grave as this problem is, it is not insurmountable. We must remind ourselves of the fact that partly through the assistance of the United States, 28 million Filipinos are free; 14,300,000 South Vietnamese remain outside the Communist bloc; Greece and Iran are still free; and with British assistance, 7 million Malayans retained their freedom. The states on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc have been the most severely tested. In non-contiguous areas, where there were no bases nearby into which the Communists could reach for quick resupply and reinforcement, and without the leverage given by the direct threat of overt military aggression, they failed in Malaya, the Philippines, and—in the late stages of the fight—in Greece.

EFFORTS TO COUNTER COVERT AGGRESSION

The President has stressed the urgency of combatting Communist wars of covert aggression and we are acting to meet the problem. I should like to explain briefly to you how we are going about this task in the Department of Defense.

Our first problem is that of organizing and directing the effort. Both General Lemnitzer² and I spend a good part of our time giving personal direction to this endeavor. For instance, in the past 60 days we have twice been to Honolulu to meet with Admiral [Harry] Felt, the Pacific Commander, and with senior commanders to discuss our defense contribution to South Vietnam. I intend to

² Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

continue this practice on a monthly basis. We started similar meetings with our Caribbean Commander. We were there last Saturday.

In addition, Major General John A. Heintges, who served as chief of the Programs Evaluation Office in Laos from 1959 to 1961, has been designated as the chief focal point within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization for problems pertaining to covert aggression. Brigadier General William B. Rosen has been designated Special Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff for the same purpose.

Under Presidential direction, I am sending senior officers from all services upon orientation and study trips to places in which Communist covert aggression is present or threatened. I have instructed that all promotions to senior Army positions be reviewed to make certain that senior officers are professionally qualified in all phases of warfare, including the counter-insurgency type. Doctrines are being refined within all service schools, and training courses for many officers who require further professional instruction are being intensified and expanded.

SUPPORT GIVEN TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

We recognize that our task overseas is largely to provide support to foreign military establishments and foreign governments. They do the job. We advise them and we support their anti-covert aggression activities. Our advice and support must be sound. It must fit in with that given to the same governments by the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency. The advice and support given to foreign governments by all of us must form a pattern of activities which, if vigorously prosecuted, will bring success.

The balance of diplomatic, political, economic, psychological, military, and intelligence programs is difficult to strike. The Communists are attempting to establish states within states. There is competition by force and persuasion for the allegiance and control of entire populations. It is not only guerrilla warfare that is involved; it is total warfare on the level beneath that of overt invasion. During fiscal year 1962 we have worked hard, across administrative lines, to develop country plans which, when fitted into plans by foreign governments, together comprise a way to win.

EXAMPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

The dual overt and covert threat that exists in certain countries along the border of the bloc makes the problem particularly difficult. South Vietnam provides a good example. Vietnam's military forces must be poised for double assignment. They must be light, fast, and quickly responsive to the internal threat, while retaining the capability of assembling quickly should weight and width be required to meet an external thrust from North Vietnam.

In South Vietnam, the United States is contributing that which the Vietnamese cannot themselves contribute: helicopters, versatile aircraft, transports, river boats, sea patrol boats, communications equipment, maintenance and construction gear. Experienced U.S. training, staffing, and intelligence teams are also helping bridge the gulf of inexperience.

ASSISTANCE TO NON-CONTIGUOUS COUNTRIES

In addition to countries contiguous to the bloc, the Department of Defense is also assisting countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. These are the countries whose first concern is internal security and whose force structures reflect the response to internal covert aggression more than to an external threat.

Our Military Assistance Missions and Advisory Groups are concentrating now upon the development of training, organization, equipment, and doctrine which can best assist countries like Colombia, Peru, Liberia, and Ethiopia to maintain internal security and help meet the needs of their awakening peoples. We are training friendly officers to use their security forces to assist in educating the people, providing sanitation, building schoolhouses, constructing farm-to-market roads, and treating their injuries and illnesses, as well as to protect them. These latter measures are part of the program known as Civic Action. They are essential elements of the larger effort of our military to assist the governments and people of the lesser developed countries to reinforce their defenses against the internal threats to their security.

DOD'S VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT

The policies of this administration on disarmament can be described in detail more appropriately by others. We in the Department of Defense have naturally played an active part in the greatly intensified study and research in this vital area that has gone on in the past year, and have been fully consulted in the development of national policy.

Briefly stated, our thinking on disarmament and arms control involves three central considerations. First, U.S. security may be enhanced by multilateral limitations and restraints on military capabilities—provided they are fairly designed and faithfully executed. Second, any system of disarmament or arms control that is adopted must include the pressures necessary to ensure Soviet compliance—to ensure that the Soviets cannot, through a covert violation, obtain a measure of military superiority over the United States.

Finally, any measures that are adopted must be designed in a manner that will preclude a decisive change in the relative military positions or capabilities of the two sides to our disadvantage. This means, for example, that measures which would reduce overall U.S. nuclear superiority should be matched by corresponding reductions in those Communist bloc superiorities which threaten friendly areas now protected largely by our nuclear deterrent.

Before closing, I would like to touch briefly on three factors which, while not directly related to the foregoing discussion, are central to our military posture, and of especial concern to this committee. The factors are mobility, military assistance, and State Department-Defense relationships.

MOBILITY OVERSEAS BASE REQUIREMENTS

In the East-West conflict, the Communists are clearly the military aggressor. The West does not seek its goals by military attacks. Thus the initiative rests with the Sino-Soviet bloc. It can

strike from its power center at a time of its own choosing, anywhere along its 14,000-mile frontier opposite the free world. This factor generates a requirement for a high order of U.S. military mobility.

In the defense establishment, we are concentrating on improving our capacity for getting quickly into action wherever needed. We are needed. We are expanding air and sea lifts, prestocking equipment abroad for forces in the United States, developing a novel shipborne forward floating depot—a self-contained, mobile, U.S. sea base, capable of delivering equipment and support anywhere on the Indian Ocean or Southeast Asian littoral in 5 to 25 days. We are also increasing the active forces held ready in the United States.

An element of mobility that is of particular current concern relates to our overseas base structure. Base requirements are not immutable; they change with change in equipment and weapons. However, as long as we must be ready to bring force to the Communist perimeter, a large and complex structure of bases, including, periodically, new ones, will be absolutely necessary.

I am aware of the political difficulties this requirement poses. We have experienced problems, as you know, with France, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and others, and foresee difficulties in the Azores, perhaps Spain, and elsewhere, but we must contrive to hold the needed structure. Loss of the Azores, for example, would seriously curtail our ability to move forces rapidly to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Bases remain an urgent and continuing problem.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

On the second of the three factors I mentioned, military assistance, I shall be appearing before you in April to present the specific elements of the program for fiscal year 1963. Let me, however, today indicate the highlights of our approach in this area.

In the NATO area, we are continuing major grant programs to Greece and Turkey, which clearly lack the resources to take the essential steps to develop their non-nuclear capabilities. For other countries, however, we have continued the policy of reducing or eliminating grant aid. In the few cases where it will be continued, this aid will be expressly contingent upon at least equal additional efforts by the recipient countries. Almost all the key European countries are now economically capable of carrying their own full share of the NATO defense burden.

A corollary to this military assistance policy is, of course, the effort that we have made to offset the balance of payments costs of our forces in Germany through an undertaking by the German Government to expand its military purchases of goods and services from the United States in amounts approximately equal to those costs. We are now seeking a similar arrangement with France.

REVIEW OF POLICY REGARDING MAJOR RECIPIENTS

From a dollar standpoint, the bulk of military assistance continues to go to the key allied countries on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc—Korea, the Republic of China, Turkey, Greece, Iran, and Pakistan. Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, Thailand, are spe-

cial cases, and, as you know, in Vietnam we are going all-out to assist them.

Over the past year, we have started an intensive review of military assistance policy in the six major recipient countries I have listed above. The effort has been to see whether military assistance can be reduced so as to permit greater relative allocations of U.S. aid on the economic side, and also, where possible, to reduce the burden on the local defense budget. This review has already resulted in some adjustments of the military assistance program without, however, reducing military force levels to an unacceptable degree.

A major question concerns Korea, where it has not been wise to consider an adjustment of the force level up to the present time, but where we are now engaged in a special overall strategic review to see what the future United States/Korean posture should be. It involves a most difficult weighing of strategic risks against the necessity for greater economic and political programs within Korea. I know that this matter has been of concern to this committee in the past, and I shall be prepared to speak to it more fully when we present the military assistance program.

IMPORTANCE OF BOTH LARGE AND SMALL PROGRAMS

Whatever adjustments we may make in these key programs, however, I should like to make it clear that each of these countries will continue to require major forces as a part of the overall defense posture of the free world. Unless external security remains assured, we cannot expect them to make the social and economic progress that is vital to their longterm stability.

The third and growing concern of the military assistance program is with those countries that do not confront a direct external threat from the Sino-Soviet bloc, but where there is a continuing threat of internal subversion. The dollar amounts we devote to Latin America, to Africa, and to countries in other areas falling within this category are not large. However, we have been devoting an intensive effort to the refinement and improvement of these programs, having regard to the particular local political situation in each case. I am convinced that we must do a much more effective job in this regard, particularly in Latin America, if these countries are to have the stability and freedom from Communist disruption that are essential to their continuing progress.

STATE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS

I said at the start of this statement that I would confine myself to military matters. In this period of cold war, covert aggression, and crisis, however, political and military matters are so deeply and continuously intertwined that the State-Defense relationship becomes an element of our military capability. Perhaps I should report briefly on that relationship as I see it.

The State Department is responsible, under the President, for formulating and directing the implementation of our foreign policy. This is fully understood in the Defense Department. On the other hand, in this time of troubles, military considerations bear on many aspects of our foreign policy, and in some cases may even govern policy decisions. It is our duty, from the Defense side,

to insure that the military considerations which apply are made known to the State Department at various levels, and supported adequately in State's decision-making process. Occasionally, on basic matters where important political and military objectives diverge, it is desirable to present the issue to the President for decision.

ON A SOUND FOOTING

Extensive machinery exists in both Departments to implement this relationship, both in Washington and in the field. In my judgment, it is working well.

My own contacts with Secretary Rusk are frequent, cordial, and effective. Members of my office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the service departments have numbers of contacts, daily, with State Department officers. Military members of country teams throughout the world, and major commanders and their staffs, have intimate contact with ambassadors and embassy staffs abroad. Foreign Service officers serve as political advisers on the staffs of our major commanders. It is reported to me that in these contacts, in all but a handful of cases which can be corrected at higher levels, military considerations are given a full hearing and due weight in decisions.

I consider that State-Defense relationships, based upon mutual respect and understanding, are on a sound footing.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement.

U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. It is a very informative statement. You certainly are involved all over the world.

Secretary McNAMARA. Much too much.

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to ask you a few questions with reference to one area, and probably others will deal with other areas. I want to ask a few questions based on Vietnam. How many American military personnel do we have now in Vietnam? Could you break this down as to the number and kinds of units that are there?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would be very happy to submit for the record a detailed statement of this. It is changing very rapidly.

There were approximately 1,000 U.S. military personnel there roughly the first of October of last year. That is rising rapidly toward a total of between 5,500 and 6,000 which we anticipate will be there by, roughly, July 1 of this year. At the present time—this is, say, February 10—we have on the order of 3,500.

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not see any need of your preparing a statement, if you could just give us a rough idea.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. Of the 3,500 we have, perhaps, 675 in three helicopter companies, roughly 225 per company, with a total of about 60 helicopters. We have about on the order of 5 to 600 in communication units. The communication facilities in the country, as you can well imagine, are very primitive.

There are 90 South Vietnamese battalions. We are placing five advisers with each battalion. There will, therefore, be 450 assigned in that role.

These advisers will include intelligence, communications, and tactical operational officers. Not all of those are there. I would say of the 450, as of today, probably not over 100 or 150 are in place.

We have several hundred carrying out the normal functions of a military advisory group, handling the receipt and disbursement of the materiel and the follow-up on the use of materiel. We have the remaining number handling training functions for the civil guard, the self-defense corps, and the Vietnamese Army.

SHIPMENTS OF MATERIEL

Senator SPARKMAN. Are we shipping a great deal of materiel into the country?

Secretary McNAMARA. The largest shipments in terms of dollar value recently have been the 60 helicopters. We are not shipping large amounts of additional materiel in any normal sense of the word. We are, as I have indicated, greatly expanding the number of men who are there on training and advisory missions.

I omitted reference to two missions I should tell you about. One is what is known as Jungle Jim, which is a small air force training unit consisting of 16 planes and a small number of officers and men, something on the order of perhaps 150 altogether, which is sent there for training the Vietnamese Air Force in guerrilla type operations.

Also we have a small number of naval vessels present to assist the Vietnamese Navy, which is very small, in the development of coastal patrols to prevent further incursions by North Vietnamese along the coast. That would be about 150 men.

U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE; AMERICAN CASUALTIES

Senator SPARKMAN. What naval forces, if any, do we have available in these waters?

Secretary McNAMARA. We have portions of the Seventh Fleet in the area, but the only vessels close to shore, say within 100 to 150 miles, would be two or three patrol boats which are assisting the South Vietnamese Navy in identifying North Vietnamese junks and shipping moving in the South Vietnamese coast.

Senator SPARKMAN. How many casualties have we had in Vietnam?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would want to check this for the record, but I believe we had two men killed in a grenade accident, unrelated to enemy action at all; one man killed, and one man missing, I believe, plus the three deaths that were referred to yesterday on which I have not received a full report. So I would say less than 10 and probably on the order of 6.

ARE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT MARKED?

Senator SPARKMAN. Are American aircraft that are operating there marked as American aircraft?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Are the helicopters and the few planes you mentioned the only—

Secretary McNAMARA. Those are the only operational ones we have.

Senator SPARKMAN. But they are clearly marked as American aircraft?

Secretary McNAMARA. They are. The helicopters are functioning as transporters of Vietnamese troops from one point to another. They are not participating in the action beyond that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask what is the significance of the question whether they are marked or not marked? Is there anything that is important about that?

Senator SPARKMAN. No; I just do not know. I just wanted to find out.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would like, in view of your answers, to go off the record here.

Senator SPARKMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, what steps have been taken, how much progress has been made, or I will put it to you this way: has effective progress been made in the reforms that President Diem was going to put into effect?

Secretary McNAMARA. This is a question that could be answered much more authoritatively by the State Department. I do not really wish to give an answer therefore. My opinion is, yes.

LIKELIHOOD, IMPORTANCE OF DEFEATING VIET CONG

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you believe that the South Vietnamese can defeat the Viet Cong under President Diem's leadership?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe that we should do everything possible to assist them to do so.

The Viet Cong are continuing to increase their forces in South Vietnam. They are continuing to supply those forces across the Lao-tian border and by sea.

It is too early to say whether the South Vietnamese will be successful in defeating the Viet Cong, but I believe very strongly we should make every effort to assist them to that end.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, hasn't the President expressed a determination that we would do that?

Secretary McNAMARA. He has.

Senator SPARKMAN. Don't we regard it as being absolutely necessary that we defeat them?

Secretary McNAMARA. I am tempted to say, yes. But I do not wish that to be interpreted as meaning that we consider it to be so essential that we would, for example, or that we have decided that it is so essential that we would deploy U.S. combat troops there. No such decision has been made.

We believe it highly desirable for the South Vietnamese to defeat the Viet Cong. We are committed to a program of providing them all possible training assistance and materiel support to that end, but it is too early to say that they will be successful with such training support and materiel assistance, and if they are not suc-

cessful, we have made no decisions as to what the next act would be.

GUERRILLA TRAINING

Senator SPARKMAN. Are we training any of the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics for use against North Vietnam?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would like to go off the record again.

Senator SPARKMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator from Alabama ask another question, will the Secretary comment on whether the jurisdiction of this guerrilla training apparently lies in some agency partly outside of the Pentagon Building? I would like to know why, if that is true.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SPARKMAN. This is my last question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would the Senator yield for a preliminary question to you again?

[Discussion off the record.]

VIETNAM COMPARED TO GREECE

Senator SPARKMAN. The only additional question I wanted to ask is, isn't this operation in South Vietnam rather similar to the one we had in Greece back in 1946, 1947?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, it is. It is different, particularly at the present time, in that the guerrillas in South Vietnam are being supplied, quite openly and directly, by North Vietnam in a way that certainly in the latter parts of the Greek operation was not apparent.

- **Senator SPARKMAN.** Senator Wiley.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY; SITUATION IN CHINA

Senator WILEY. I want to compliment you on this statement, sir. Of course, to a large extent it confirms what we all know from reading the magazines and the newspapers.

I did want to ask you about whether you have any information that would tell us what the situation is between China, Mao Tse-tung, and Russia, Khrushchev. In other words, here we have your analysis which clearly shows that we have the deterrent power militarily. I wonder if you have any information to show that there are other deterrents such as internal dissension, I mean proof of dissension between Mao Tse-tung, and also what the situation is in the Far East in relation to possibly Mao Tse-tung thinking that the time is ripe for him to strike Formosa.

I realize a lot of this is a matter of CIA, also a matter of importance for the State Department. I think it is vital for you, too, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. Senator Wiley, these questions, as you have indicated, are primarily matters of foreign policy, but I will say this: first, we do have evidence that the Chinese military forces are being adversely affected by conditions within Red China. They have suffered lack of supplies; they have suffered lack of food. They

have been adversely affected by diversions of petroleum and other products from the military forces to other parts of the economy.

We do not have any information that indicates that Red China will or will not in the near future attack Taiwan. Our sources of intelligence are not sufficiently complete to bring information to bear on that point.

It is difficult to say who is supplying and who is directing the supply of the Pathet Lao in Laos, and who lies behind the efforts of the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam.

There is some indication that the Soviet Union and Red China are following somewhat contradictory courses in those two areas. But beyond that very general statement, I am not prepared to answer in more detail.

CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Senator WILEY. Are the Chinese getting any of these modern weapons?

Secretary McNAMARA. China is undoubtedly developing a nuclear bomb. However, our information as to their progress is not complete. We do believe that they will have the capability of detonating such a bomb within, perhaps, 12 to 36 months, but I think the possibility that they would be able to launch it successfully against any distant target is not great, and will not be great for a number of years.

We have no information to indicate that the Soviet Union is making available nuclear weapons to the Red Chinese.

CREDIBILITY OF U.S. DETERRENT

Senator WILEY. Is it your judgment that the deterrents that we have discussed, military and otherwise, have put off the day that Khrushchev would think, or whoever was in charge would think, to let the balloon go up?

Secretary McNAMARA. I do not believe that Khrushchev wishes to engage in nuclear war any more than we do. I think our danger is not that he would initiate such a war consciously and knowingly, but rather that the credibility of our deterrent is low as a deterrent against acts of political aggression, and is low against certain minor acts of military aggression, and that he may misjudge the point at which we would apply our nuclear power.

This is the danger, and I think, by far the greatest danger, we face. To minimize that danger or reduce it, we have tried, and will continue to try, to increase our non-nuclear power, thereby being able to respond more effectively to the Soviet Union's acts of political aggression or minor military aggression, and thereby reducing the danger of nuclear war.

SOVIET WEAPONS IN CUBA

Senator WILEY. How many nuclear bombs and otherwise has Cuba gotten from Khrushchev?

Secretary McNAMARA. We cannot say absolutely they have received none, but it is my firm belief they have received none.

Senator WILEY. That is all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Mansfield.

FUNCTION OF CIA

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I want to join with the other members of the committee in commending you on an excellent statement concerning the world situation as it affects our country.

I assume that all the members of this committee had a pretty good idea that the CIA was operating in Laos, Vietnam, perhaps Cambodia and other places in that part of the world, and in other areas as well.

Is the CIA operating on a basis of setting policy? Is it operating on a basis of equality, or is it operating in a subordinate position?

Secretary McNAMARA. The CIA does not operate in any of these areas, to the best of my knowledge, in a way that allows it or permits it to set policy. It operates only in accordance with established policy, policy established by the President, policies that are fully known to us and fully coordinated with us in the Defense Department.

Senator MANSFIELD. Its primary function is the gathering, coordinating, and the evaluating of information?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is.

MILITARY SITUATION IN LAOS

Senator MANSFIELD. At the present time, there is a struggle going on in the region of Nam Tha in Laos. What is the military situation there?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is very obscure. It appears to us that the Pathet Lao, if they choose, can take control of that village. They have not done so yet, or at least had not as of last night, based on the last information I received.

Senator MANSFIELD. On the basis of the huge amounts of money which we have expended in the maintenance of the Laotian Army which, incidentally, includes allowances for their families—on the basis of the year's further training and an increase in the size of the force, are they proving any more effective at present than they were a year ago?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, materially so. The size of the military forces has been increased during that period of time. The equipment supplied to those forces has also been increased. They are far better trained than they were. They appear to have a higher morale today than they did 1 year ago or even 6 months ago.

But, unfortunately, during the same period of time the number of Vietnamese opposing the force has more than doubled and almost quadrupled, and the North Vietnamese are much more effective soldiers than either the Pathet Lao or the Royal Laotian Army personnel.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, am I to understand from your answer that the North Vietnamese are in Laos in force and aligning themselves with the Pathet Lao?

Secretary McNAMARA. They are.

AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN LAOS

Senator MANSFIELD. How many American personnel are now in Laos?

Secretary McNAMARA. About 750, I believe.

Senator MANSFIELD. How many of these, roughly, are with Lao-tian Army units?

Secretary McNAMARA. In contrast to South Vietnam, where I am intimately acquainted with the number, I will have to express a guess here, and I will insert it in the record, but it is on the order of 550 to 600.

ARE AMERICANS IN LAOS UNDERCUTTING POLICY?

Senator MANSFIELD. One more question, Mr. Secretary.

There have been published reports that American military personnel in Laos have openly criticized official policy there. Recently the committee has received other reports charging that both the military and CIA personnel are undercutting official policy by encouraging General Phoumi to reject any compromise of his basic position.

What is your comment on these reports?

Secretary McNAMARA. I have found no evidence to support the reports. Our instructions to our personnel in Laos, and also South Vietnam, are very clear and specific on these points. In the case of Laos, they are, under no circumstances to support Phoumi in his intransigence; in the case of South Vietnam, under no circumstances, to add to the current of criticism that is directed against Diem.

There have been reports that contrary actions have taken place in both cases. I have not found any evidence to support those reports, but I have taken action to make certain that the instructions are clear to the personnel involved.

Senator MANSFIELD. I am very happy to have the answer, Mr. Secretary, because I think that you must have seen some of these newspaper stories which have appeared. I am especially happy about what you had to say relative to Diem, who, in spite of all his faults, is the only man, in my opinion, capable of keeping South Vietnam free and keeping it independent. I think that a lot of these people who criticize him ought to recognize that without him and our aid, there would be no free Vietnam today, and he should be given a good deal more in the way of credit, I think, than criticism, as has been the case and seems to be increasing in this country.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Carlson.

AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN CIVILIAN DRESS

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, just one or two questions.

I agree with the other members that this is an excellent statement. In fact, I think it is something that our people and the country should continue to get this information on our military strength. I think it is important from our national standpoint and the world standpoint.

Ambassador Nolting was before this committee 2 or 3 weeks ago, and he made a very interesting comment that I have been thinking about. As I got it, he stated that our military personnel who are in Vietnam, when they mingle with the people, dress in civilian clothes. In other words, they mix with the people, and you do not realize they are American soldiers.

Is that true?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is true, in part. Frequently they do wear uniforms, but at other times they wear civilian clothes.

Senator CARLSON. Well, now, as of July 1 we will have 6,000 U.S. soldiers in this area. Is that to our advantage or disadvantage to have these folks wear civilian clothes?

It seems to me we are a great nation, and the soldier's uniform would, I think, add some strength and stability to them. Maybe I am wrong.

AVOID DRAMATIZING NUMBER OF PERSONNEL

Secretary McNAMARA. At the present time we are refraining from publicly stating the number of men we have in South Vietnam, hoping to avoid a direct clash with the ICC on this question. I think it would be unwise under these current circumstances to dramatize by any means the number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese are very sensitive to the extent to which we appear to be directing their military effort, or directing their nation for that matter. For both these reasons, therefore, I think it is unwise to dramatize our power.

Senator CARLSON. It just occurs to me in view of the fact that we are building up from 1,500 to 6,000 in July, we are so committed that I do not think there is any use of our trying to deceive ourselves that we are not involved and will continue to be, based on your own statement. I think what we will all agree on is that no matter what the cost is going to be, we will be in there with strength, and we are going to have to stay. That, to me, appears a possible battleground in the future, and I do not see that we gain anything by trying at the present time to not be out in the open, but I am sure you have studied this through.

NUMBER OF POLARIS SUBMARINES

I have several other questions.

You mentioned in your statement the number of missiles that we have. I think you stated we have 80 operational Polaris missiles.

Secretary McNAMARA. I did, sir.

Senator CARLSON. How many Polaris submarines do we have?

Secretary McNAMARA. There are six missile submarines and, therefore, there are five we call operational. There is a sixth at sea, but not fully deployed as yet.

Senator CARLSON. How many do you expect to have within the next 12 months or so?

Secretary McNAMARA. We expect to have 29 at sea by the end of calendar 1964. By July 1, 1963, we expect to have 192 Polaris missiles operational.

Senator CARLSON. In how many submarines, five to each?

Secretary McNAMARA. That would be 12 submarines.